On quantifiers and bare nouns in Inuktitut*

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In this paper I examine nouns and quantifiers in Inuktitut, arguing that an account that assumes covert determiners is problematic. Instead, nouns in Inuktitut are shown to be arguments by default, only receiving predicative readings when additional morphology is added. Furthermore, the behaviour of nouns and the types of quantifiers present in the language point to a lack of determiner heads in the syntax.

1 Introduction

Cross-linguistically, languages without overt determiners are assumed to have phonologically null determiners. The presence of these covert determiners is needed to explain the fact that nouns behave as arguments in some constructions, while in others they appear to act as predicates. Thus, a determiner of type <<e,t>,e> takes an inherently predicative noun of type <e,t> as its input and generates an argument of type <e>. Thus, the universality of determiners is used to account for the dual nature of nouns.

Inuktitut (Eskimo-Aleut), is a language without overt determiners. Despite having overt case morphemes, plural and dual marking, and a myriad of other overt functional elements, there are no articles equivalent to English a or the. While the standard account would assume that determiners in Inuktitut are phonologically null, I contend that in fact determiners, and moreover the D head, are not present in the syntax of Inuktitut.

1.1 Topics of investigation

Several divergent properties of the language point to a lack of determiners. The lack of D-quantifiers such as English no or every in the language, the lack of singular generics readings such as a knife is a useful tool, the need for a copula for nouns to act as predicates, and finally the behaviour of quantified and bare arguments with respect to

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scope all point to there not being any determiners. Using data from native speakers of the North Baffin Island dialect and to a very limited extent a speaker of the South Baffin Island dialect, I argue that the D head is in fact absent from the language. Moreover, a determiner-free account of Inuktitut will be shown to explain a great deal about the phenomena mentioned above.

1.2 Layout of the following sections

Section Two provides a brief background of the structure of Inuktitut, including the relevant cases, the nature of noun-incorporation in the language, a summary of agreement morphology, the antipassive construction, and the variable ordering of arguments.

Section Three is an inventory of the quantifiers in Inuktitut, with special attention paid to the types of quantifiers present in the language and those that are suspiciously absent. Additionally, the problematic nature of two quantifiers in particular will be addressed.

Next, Section Four examines both standard and alternative approaches to quantifiers and nouns in Inuktitut. The problems associated with assuming covert determiners will be investigated as well as the benefits of a determiner-free analysis.

In Section Five an alternative syntactic analysis of scope in Inuktitut is attempted and ultimately shown to be problematic. Instead, a treatment of scope in terms of specificity will be shown to be superior.

Finally, in Section Six, I summarise and conclude, tying together the various arguments against covert determiners.

2 Background on Inuktitut

Inuktitut is part of a family of related dialects that stretch across Alaska, northern Canada, and Greenland. I use Inuktitut to refer roughly to the dialects spoken in Nunavut, Canada, and in particular the North and South Baffin Island dialects.

Inuktitut is a polysynthetic language in which a word may contain numerous morphemes. For instance, (1) below from the related Kangiryuarmiut dialect (Lowe, 1985:18, modified):

(1) umiŋmak-hiu-riaqtu-qati-gi-tqi-limaiq-t-a-ra
  muskox-hunt-go.for-partner-have.as-again-will.no.more-DEC-IND-1SG.3SG
  ‘I’ll never go muskox hunting with him again.’

The word/sentence in (1) contains an incorporated noun, umiŋmak ‘muskox’, as well as numerous functional morphemes.

The case system in Inuktitut is ergative/absolutive with ergative arguments taking a case marker and absolutive arguments appearing bare (Spreng, 2001:161, simplified):
(2) Jak-up iglu sana-vaa.  
Jake-ERG house(ABS) build-IND.3SG/3SG  
‘Jake is building the house.’

Verbs bearing transitive morphology, including double agreement with both subject and object, take ergative and absolutive arguments.

Intransitive verbs, which bear single-argument agreement morphology, take only an absolutive argument (p.158):

(3) anguti niri-vuq  
man(ABS) eat-IND.3SG  
‘the man is eating’

As well, intransitive verbs are used in an antipassive construction that appears to take arguments with nominative/accusative case (p.161, modified):

(4) Jake sana-vuq iglu-mik.  
Jake(ABS) build-IND.3SG house-ACC  
‘Jake is building a house.’

While some verbs require an antipassive morpheme to allow such structures, others such as ‘build’ in (4), do not.

It is assumed here, as elsewhere, that both absolutive and nominative are in fact the same case, as neither has an overt case marker nor exhibits any difference in behaviour.

In addition, a limited set of light verbs (see Johns, 2003 for a detailed analysis of these verbs) require the incorporation of the object noun:

(5) iqaluk-tu-tuinna-suun-γ-u-γa  
fish-eat-only-one.who-COP-IND-INTR-1SG  
‘I only eat fish.’

Such incorporation only involves bare nominal roots. Any modifiers of the noun in such structures are left outside the verbal complex.

The language also exhibits a highly variable word-order. Gillon (1999:20) observes that a simple three-word sentence is grammatical in all six possible orders:

(6) a. Suusan Taivit-mik nagligusuk-puq  
Susan David-acc love-3sg.intr.indic  
‘Susan loves David.’

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1 According to Spreng, the accusative (-mik) argument is less definite than other arguments with different cases.
2 Assumedly the subject ‘I’ is a pro.
3 While the original contains -vuq instead of -puq endings, these appear to be typographical errors.
As such, very little attention will be paid to word-order. Instead morpheme-order will take precedence.

In addition to the central cases mentioned thus far, there exist also vialis, genitive, ablative, locative, terminative, and simulative. However, few of these will appear in the subsequent discussion.

Case and number are often bundled together in syncretic morphemes. As such, there are often three forms of the various case markers, corresponding to singular, dual, and plural.

Additional information on specific aspects of the language will be provided as needed throughout the text.

3 The Inventory of quantifiers

This section examines the inventory of quantifiers in the Baffin Island dialects of Inuktitut. While the previous work on quantification in Inuit languages has examined various aspects of quantification, particularly in West Greenlandic (Bittner (1995)), little has been said about the quantifiers themselves; especially those of Inuktitut dialects. To this end, I will first review Denny (1981)’s analysis of the suffixed quantifiers -tuaq, -innaq, and -tuinnaq, which he argues correspond to various interpretations of English only. After that, I will present the data that I collected from a speaker of the North Baffin dialect, highlighting the differences between the quantifiers in Inuktitut and more familiar languages.

4 While there are a number of differences between North and South Baffin dialects, this investigation will attempt to examine the quantifiers and quantificational structures common to both dialects.
3.1 Denny (1981)

Denny (1981) presents three infixes, -tuaq, -innaq, and -tuinnaq, as being variations of exclusive only. Beginning with the assumption that “only” asserts that other possibilities, usually unmentioned, are excluded, Denny argues that when combined with nominals -tuaq excludes other possible objects, -innaq excludes other possible characteristics, and that -tuinnaq excludes both other possible objects and characteristics. To illustrate, he gives the following derivations of the nouns imaq (water) and umiaq (boat) (p.115-116):

(7) a. ima-tuaq
   water-TUAQ
   ‘The only one that is water.’

b. ima-innaq
   water-INNAQ
   ‘The one that is only water.’

c. ima-tuinnaq
   water-TUINNAQ
   ‘Only the one that is water’

(8) a. umia-tuaq
   boat-TUAQ
   ‘The only one that is a boat.’

b. umia-nginnaq5
   boat-INNAQ
   ‘The one that is only a boat.’

c. umia-tuinnaq
   boat-TUINNAQ
   ‘Only the one that is a boat.’

Associating objects with argumenthood and characteristics with predicatehood, Denny assumes that nouns in Inuktitut “[convey] both an argument and a predicate: inuk means ‘one that is a person’” (p.117). He concludes that the three infixes are quantifiers – -tuaq quantifying over arguments, -innaq quantifying over predicates, and -tuinnaq quantifying over both.

Denny goes on to argue that his account is supported on morphological grounds as well. Just as the meaning of tuinnaq is a combination of the meanings of -tuaq and -innaq, he posits that -tuinnaq is etymologically a lexicalisation of -tuaq and -innaq:

5 Here /ŋ/ is added for phonotactic reasons – to break up the illicit string of three vowels.
(9) tuaq+innaq > tua+innaq > tuinnaq

As we saw in (9), the uvular stop deletes before -innaq. Furthermore, “deletion of a middle vowel is one way in which Inuktitut reduces the impermissible combination of three vowels” (p.117)\(^6\).

These infixes can also apply to verbs, yielding similar results. While Denny provides his own translations for the following sentences to disambiguate them, I have included a more natural English translation (identical in all three sentences) and I have chosen to use my own event-based paraphrases\(^7\) (p.118):

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. isuma-ttua-t-u-q  
\hspace{1cm} think-TUAQ-DEC-INTR-3SG  
\hspace{1cm} ‘He/she is only thinking.’  
\hspace{1cm} (There is only one event, which is that of thinking, and he/she is the agent of that event.)  
\item b. isuma-inna-t-u-q  
\hspace{1cm} think-INNAQ-DEC-INTR-3SG  
\hspace{1cm} ‘He/she is only thinking.’  
\hspace{1cm} (There is an event, which is only that of thinking, and he/she is the agent of that event.)  
\item c. isuma-tuinna-t-u-q  
\hspace{1cm} think-TUINNAQ-DEC-INTR-3SG  
\hspace{1cm} ‘He/she is only thinking.’  
\hspace{1cm} (There is only one event, which is only that of thinking, and he/she is the agent of that event.)
\end{enumerate}

Thus, parallel to his analysis of nouns, -tuaq excludes other events, -innaq excludes other predicates, and -tuinnaq excludes both other events and other predicates.

Denny’s account attempts to provide a systematic account of the distribution of -tuaq, -innaq, and -tuinnaq in Inuktitut based on the type of thing being excluded; objects/events, predicates, or both. Yet, as we will see in section 3.2.5, additional problems arise when -innaq and -tuinnaq appear to be used as universal quantifiers without the exclusion we expect from only.

### 3.2 Elicitation data

Unless specifically noted otherwise, the data in this section is based on elicitation with a native speaker of the North Baffin dialect of Inuktitut from Iglulik, Nunavut.

\(^{6}\) Another alternative is that -tuinnaq is merely -innaq added to the singular, intransitive, indicative verbal morphology -tuq. However this is not possible, since -tuq cannot appear on nouns without a copula, yet -tuinnaq does.

\(^{7}\) What Denny refers to as “occurrences” I assume to mean events.
3.2.1 tama(q)

*Tama(q)*\(^8\) is one of several quantifiers used to express universality in Inuktitut. It may appear alongside nouns, as in (11), or alone as an argument, as in (12), and is inflected for person and number, as shown in (13):

(11) tamar-mi\(^9\) arna-it ani-j-u-t
    TAMA-3SG woman-PL leave-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘All the women left.’

(12) tamar-mi ani-j-u-t
    TAMA-3SG leave-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘Everybody left.’

(13) a. tamat-ta ani-j-u-gut
    TAMA-1PL leave-DEC-INTR-1PL
    ‘All of us left.’

b. taman-nuk ani-j-u-guk
    TAMA-1DU leave-DEC-INTR-1DU
    ‘Both of us left.’

c. tamas-si ani-g-itti
    TAMA-2PL leave-IMP-2PL
    ‘All of you leave!’

d. tamar-mi ani-j-u-t
    TAMA-3.SG leave-DEC-INTR-PL/DU
    ‘All of them left.’

e. tamar-mi-k ani-j-u-t
    TAMA-3-DU leave-DEC-INTR-PL/DU
    ‘Both of them left.’

To rule out the possibility that *tama(q)* corresponds to a distributive quantifier like English *each*, the following sentences were elicited:

(14) tamar-mi iglu-dʒua-q miñua-lauq-t-a-ra
    TAMA-3SG house-big-SG paint-PAST-DEC-TR-1SG.3SG
    ‘I painted all (of) the house.’ (i.e. the whole house)

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\(^8\) Final /q/ deletes, undergoes partial assimilation, or assimilates completely in its various inflected forms.

\(^9\) Final consonant deletion appears to be optional in this dialect, except in utterance final position.
(15) tamar-mi iglu-t miŋua-lauq-t-a-kka
   TAMA-3SG house-PL paint-PAST-DEC-TR-1SG.3PL
   ‘I painted all (of) the houses.’

When combined with a singular argument as in (14), *tama(q)* produces a cumulative reading in which the entire house is understood to be painted, while in (15) with a plural noun, a distributive reading results. Thus, *tama(q)*, like English *all*, is optionally distributive if the modified noun is plural. This is in contrast with *each* and *every*, which necessarily give a distributive reading:

(16) He painted each/every house.

The sentence in (16) cannot mean that a single house was painted entirely. Rather, it must be the case that multiple houses were painted. It appears that *tama(q)* is indeed comparable to English *all* in allowing a cumulative reading.

Furthermore, assuming *tama(q)* is a binary relation between two elements, it also has the formal properties that one would expect of a universal quantifier (Heim & Kratzer, 1998). First, based on judgements from my consultant, it is non-symmetric: from (17) below we cannot infer (18), nor vice versa:

(17) ujarali-up₁₀ tamar-mi palisi-nit arna-u-j-u-t
   ujaralik-GEN TAMA-3 police-3PL.ACC woman-COP-DEC-TR-PL
   ‘All the police of U. are women.’

(18) ujarali-up tamar-mi arna-ŋit palisi-u-j-u-t
   ujaralik-GEN TAMA-3 woman-3PL.ACC police-COP-DEC-TR-PL
   ‘All the women of U. are police.’

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, *tama(q)* is transitive, a property that seems to hold only of non-negative universal quantifiers. Thus, the truth of (19) and (20) below guarantee that of (21):

(19) ujarali-up palisi-nit tamar-mi₁¹ arna-u-j-u-t
   ujaralik-GEN police-3PL.ACC TAMA-3 woman-COP-DEC-TR-PL
   ‘All the police of U. are women.’

(20) ujarali-up arna-ŋit tamarmi qaŋatasuqtı-t
   ujaralik-GEN woman-3PL.ACC TAMA-3 pilot-PL
   ‘All the women of U. are pilots.’

¹⁰ To avoid interference from real-word facts in judgements, we used a fictional town called Ujaralik.
¹¹ While *tamarmi* here appears after the noun, this may either be an instance of quantifier float or simply due to scrambling, which is common in Inuktitut.
(21) ujarali-up palisi-nit tamar-mi qanatasuqti-t
    ujaralik-GEN police-3PL.ACC TAMA-3 pilot-PL
    ‘All the police of U. are pilots.’

The syllogism captured in (19-21) corresponds roughly to the following Venn diagram:

(22) All A are B.
    All B are C.
    ∴ All A are C.

In sum, *tama(q)* appears in most respects to behave like English *all*, having a similar distribution (appearing with both singular and plural nouns) as well as having the formal relational properties of *all* of being non-symmetric and transitive\(^\text{12}\). Finally, it remains to be seen if *tama(q)* is an A-quantifier or a D-quantifier, which will be taken up in detail in the Section Four.

### 3.2.2 -limaa(q)

Another quantifier seemingly equivalent to English *all* is *-limaa(q)*, which appears as a suffix on nouns, as in (23), and in derived words such as (24-25):

(23) aŋuti-limaa-t iglu-mi sana-qau-j-u-t
    men-LIMAA-PL house-3.ACC make-PAST-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘All the men made a house.’

(24) uqa-limaak-p-a-a
    speak-LIMAA-IND\(^\text{13}\)-TR-3SG.3SG
    ‘He reads (it).’

(25) inuusi-limaaq
    one’s.life-LIMAAQ
    ‘A whole life/lifetime.’

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\(^\text{12}\) Tests for reflexivity/irreflexivity were inconclusive, possibly due to their highly redundant nature: e.g. #tamarimi palisi palisiujut (all police are police). All such structures were rejected as being unnatural.

\(^\text{13}\) The mood I refer to herein as declarative (DEC) is commonly referred to as participial by the majority of linguists researching Inuit languages. What I have referred to as indicative (IND) though, receives the same label elsewhere. Although my labelling goes against the convention in work on Inuit languages, I believe the DEC label is much more transparent, as there is nothing participial about the mood in question.
Like *tama(q)*, it can be used with both distributive and non-distributive interpretations. Once again, these readings require singular and plural number, respectively:

(26) iglu-limaaq miquila-lauq-t-a-ra
    house-LIMAAQ paint-PAST-INC-TR-1SG.3SG
    ‘I painted all (of) the house.’

(27) ajunasukti-limaa-t tuni-lauq-t-a-kka qamuti-nik
    hunter-LIMAA-PL give-PAST-DEC-TR-1SG.3PL sled-3PL.ACC
    ‘I gave sleds to all the hunters.’

However, *limaa(q)* is different from *tama(q)* in that it can attach to verbs as well as nouns, as in (28), where it retains the meaning of a universal quantifier:

(28) taku-j-a-limaa-kka
    see-DEC-TR-LIMAA-1SG.3PL
    ‘I saw everything/everyone/all.’

In terms of formal properties, like *tama(q)*, *limaa(q)* is both non-symmetric and transitive. First, the fact that (29) and (30) cannot guarantee each other’s truth indicates that *limaa(q)* is non-symmetric:

(29) ujarali-up ama-limaa-t palisi-u-j-u-t.
    Ujaralik-GEN woman-LIMAA-PL police-COP-DEC-INTR-3PL
    ‘All the women of Ujaralik are police-officers.’

(30) ujarali-up paliisi-limaa-t ama-u-j-u-t.
    Ujaralik-GEN police-LIMAA-PL woman-COP-DEC-INTR-3PL
    ‘All the police-officers of Ujaralik are women.’

Next, (30) above and (31) below, taken together, guarantee the truth of (32), showing *limaa(q)* to be transitive as well:

(31) ujarali-up ama-limaa-t qañata-suuq-ti-t
    Ujaralik-GEN woman-LIMAA-PL fly-one.who-agent-PL
    ‘All the women of Ujaralik are pilots.’

(32) Ujaraliup paliisi-limaa-t qañata-suuq-ti-t
    Ujaralik-GEN police-LIMAA-PL fly-one.who-agent-PL
    ‘All the police-officers of Ujaralik are pilots.’

Thus, both *tama(q)* and *limaa(q)* appear to have the same formal semantic properties. While *limaa(q)* and *tama(q)* might at first appear to be synonyms or merely dialectal variants, both were used productively by my consultant, and yet for the following structure only *limaa(q)* was possible:
(33) palisi-limaa-t quqiqsa-lauq-t-u-t
    police-LIMAA-PL shoot-PAST-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘All the police were shooting.’
(34) *tamarmi palisit quqiqsalauq\textsuperscript{tut}

It is not clear what causes (34) to be ungrammatical, nor what distinction is captured by the two quantifiers.

3.2.3 ila

The only existential quantifier in Inuktitut is 
\textit{ila}. While various inflected forms of \textit{ila} correspond to English \textit{some}, it is actually a noun meaning \textit{part} or \textit{relative} (Spalding 1998). Its inflected forms roughly mean, \textit{part of us/you/them}. Like \textit{tama(q)}, \textit{ila} may modify a noun (35) or stand alone as an argument (36-37) and bears inflection for number, person, and genitive case.

(35) ila-ŋ it inu-it iqaluŋ-mi kisiana niri-suut
    ILA-3PL.GEN person-PL fish-ACC but eat-one.who-PL
    ‘Some people only eat fish.’ (\textit{lit.} Part of us people eat but fish.)

(36) ila-vut kak-t-u-t
    ILA-1PL.GEN hunger-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘Some of us are hungry.’

(37) ila-ŋ it kak-t-u-t
    ILA-3PL.GEN hunger-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘Some of them are hungry.’

In addition, Inuktitut appears to lack additional existential quantifiers such as \textit{most} and \textit{few} as distinct lexical items, instead combining \textit{ila} with other quantifiers to derive such meanings:

(38) inu-it ila-inna-ŋ it iqaluk-tu-suut
    person-PL ILA-INNAQ-3PL.GEN fish-eat-one.who-PL
    ‘Few people eat fish.’ (\textit{lit.} Only part of them people eat fish.)

As we would expect for an existential quantifier, \textit{ila} is symmetric and intransitive. Thus, (37) and (38) guarantee each other and (38-39) do not necessitate (40):

(39) ujaralip arna-ŋ it ila-ŋ it palisi-u-j-u-t
    Ujaralik-GEN woman-PL.ACC ILA.3PL.GEN police-COP-DEC-INTR-PL
    ‘Some of the women of Ujaralik are police.’
(40) ujarali-up palisi-nit ila-ŋit arna-u-j-u-t
Ujaralik-GEN police-PL.ACC ILA.3PL.GEN woman-COP-DEC-INTR-PL
‘Some of the police of Ujaralik are women.’

(41) ujaraliup arna-ŋit ila-ŋit qaŋatasuqui-t
Ujaralik-GEN woman-PL.ACC ILA.3PL.GEN pilot-PL
‘Some of the women of Ujaralik are pilots.’

(42) ujarali-up palisi-nit ila-ŋit qaŋatasuqūt-t
Ujaralik-GEN police-PL.ACC ILA.3PL.GEN pilot-PL
‘Some of the police of Ujaralik are pilots.’

Once again, this is easily captured in Venn diagrams:

(43) $\begin{array}{c}
\text{A} \\
\cap \\
\text{B}
\end{array}$

Some A are B
$\therefore$ Some B are A

(44) $\begin{array}{c}
\text{A} \\
\cap \\
\text{B} \\
\cap \\
\text{C}
\end{array}$

Some A are B
Some B are C
* Some A are C

While ila expresses more or less English *some*, we will see in Section Four that it is fundamentally different in one key respect. While *some* is a determiner, ila and its various forms are nominal.

Another interesting point about existential quantification in Inuktitut is the use of bare plurals instead of an overt quantifier. The following two sentences are from a speaker of the South Baffin dialect:

(45) tuktu-it uvanit taku-qau-j-u-it
caribou.PL 1SG.ACC see-PAST-DEC-INTR-PL
‘(Some) caribou saw me.’

(46) immu-mit kuvisiq-qau-j-u-nga
milk.ACC.SG spill.PAST-DEC-INTR-1SG
‘I spilt (some) milk.’

Both sentences were in response to target sentences containing English *some*, yet the consultant produced (45-46).

3.2.4 atu

Yet another universal quantifier is atu, meaning *each*. Like English *each*, atu may appear with a noun or alone. However, unlike *each*, atu combines only with plurals:
Beyond the limited amount of data I have collected from elicitation, I have been unable to find any reference to *atu* in the literature apart from a dictionary entry for *atunit*, translated as *each* (Thibert, 1976).

3.2.5 -tuaq, -innaq, and -tuinnaq revisited

I will now point out several potential problems left unresolved by Denny’s work. In particular, -*innaq* and -*tuinnaq*, while retaining their meaning of *only* in many constructions, often take on the meaning of a universal quantifier, as in (49-52):

(49) ani-j-u-inna-it
leave-DEC-INTR-INNAQ-PL
‘Everybody left.’

(50) palisinit arnainnait
police-CASE woman-INNAQ-PL
‘All the police officers are women.’

(51) ippaksaq tapagijaqaq-tuinna-u-lauq-t-u-t
yesterday tease-TUINNAQ-COP-PAST-DEC-INTR-PL
‘Yesterday, everyone teased (someone).’

(52) qamuti-qaq-tuinna-u-ŋŋit-t-u-gut
sled-have-TUINNAQ-COP-NEG-DEC-INTR-1PL
‘We don’t all have sleds.’

If -*innaq* and -*tuinnaq* are (albeit roughly) equivalent to *only*, how are these non-restrictive universal readings possible? Furthermore, if they mean *all*, why use them to express *only* when an unambiguous *only*, -*tuaq*, exists? I see no way of explaining this fact about these quantifiers and leave it to further research. According to Matthewson (p.c.), morphemes meaning both *all* and *only* are “a fairly common phenomenon” yet remain unexplained.
3.3 The absence of D-quantifiers

Notably absent from this inventory are quantifiers corresponding to English *every* and *no*. Even *atu*, glossed as *each*, is different from proto-typical *each* in that it modifies plural nouns, not singular ones. What these quantifiers have in common is that they are D-quantifiers. Compare (53) and (54) below:

(53) All/both/only/just the men left.
(54) *No/every/each the men left.

The quantifiers in (53) share the ability to co-occur with a determiner while those in (54) cannot. Assuming the quantifiers in (54) correspond (at least in part) to a D head, their absence suggests that D-quantification is not available in Inuktitut.

Also, D-quantifiers tend to make the arguments they modify referential. Compare the two English quantifiers in these widely used examples about unicorns:

(55) All unicorns have a horn.
(56) Each/every unicorn has a horn.

While both are grammatical, the latter sentence seems to more strongly imply the actual existence of unicorns. At the same time, as we will see in Section Four, nouns in Inuktitut are already referential.

In Section Four I will argue that the absence of D-quantifiers is in fact due to the absence of determiner heads in Inuktitut. As a result, only A-quantification is used.

4 Nouns in Inuktitut

In this section I will examine the nature of nouns in Inuktitut. In particular, I will investigate whether the standard semantic account of nouns as being type <e,t> predicates is satisfactory for this language. First, I will review alternative analyses contained in Bittner (1995) and Wharram (2003). While these works centre on different topics from the ones I am investigating, they both assume an analysis of nouns that I argue against. Subsequently, I offer evidence against the standard account of nouns in Inuktitut and consider the alternative analyses of nominals presented in Matthewson (2001), Chierchia (1998), and Baker (2003). Drawing on these sources, as well as work in Cowper & Hall (2003) and Cowper (2003), I present my explanation of the data in question; that nouns in Inuktitut are of type <e> (see also Johns, 2003). Finally, I present the benefits of my analysis for Inuktitut quantifiers, generics, and the scope phenomena in Wharram (2003).
4.1 Bittner (1995)


According to Bittner, sentences containing adverbial quantifiers in West Greenlandic require a scope marker, -tar-, whose position determines the scope of the A-quantifier (1995:4-5):

\[(57)\]
\[
\text{a. } \text{siurna Jaaku unammi-gaanzą-t} \\
\text{last.year Jaaku-ABS compete-when.iter-3SOBV} \\
\text{Anna-p tama-tigut ajugaa-nirar-tar-p-a-a} \\
\text{Anna-ERG all-AQ win-say-TAR-IND-[+tr]-3S-3S} \quad =2a,*b
\]

\[
\text{b. } \text{siurna Jaaku unammi-gaanzą-t} \\
\text{last.year Jaaku-ABS compete-when.iter-3SOBV} \\
\text{Anna-p tama-tigut ajugaa-sar-nirar-p-a-a} \\
\text{Anna-ERG all-AQ win-TAR-say-IND-[+tr]-3S-3S} \quad = 2a,b
\]

\[(58)\]
\[
\text{a. Last year, whenever Jaaku participated in a competition, Anna always said:} \\
\text{“He has won.”}
\]

\[
\text{b. Last year, Anna said (once): “Whenever Jaaku participates in a competition,} \\
\text{he always wins.”}
\]

In (57a), the placement of -tar- allows only the always says reading, while in (57b) the position of -tar- allows both always says and always wins interpretations.\(^{14}\) While -tar- is argued to constrain scope in West Greenlandic, an equivalent morpheme does not appear to exist in Inuktitut:

\[(59)\]
\[
\text{Bill iqaluŋ-mi niri-inna-u-jaq-t-u-(q)} \\
\text{B. fish.ACC eat-INNAQ-COP-FUT-DEC-INTR-3.SG evening-VIAL} \\
\text{unnuk-ku(t)} \quad \text{Bill will always eat fish in the evening.’}
\]

Alternatively, Johns (p.c.) suggests that -tar- may merely be a habitual aspect marker. If this is in fact the case, the placement of the morpheme is not a matter of quantifier scope, but rather marks which verb is habitual. To illustrate, compare the two Spanish sentences below:

\[(60)\]
\[
\text{Ana decía que Juan ganó.} \\
\text{A. say-IMP that John win-PAST} \\
\text{‘Anne was saying that John won.’}
\]

\(^{14}\) Bittner makes reference to the fact that the structure (in terms of left/right-branching) of this word is somewhat uncertain.
(61) Ana dijo que Juan ganaba.
   A. say-PAST that John win-IMP
   Anne said that John was winning.’

The placement of the imperfect tense (which is used to describe habitual events) determines which verb it associates with in Spanish. I believe the same is true of West Greenlandic -tar-. As such, tamar(q) is merely interpreted with the verb marked as habitual. It seems only natural that a habitual aspect marker will co-occur with quantificational adverbs such as always or often.

In contrast with A-quantifiers, Bittner states that D-quantifiers in West Greenlandic require no special scope-marking morpheme. Also, D-quantifiers are inflected for case like nouns, while A-quantifiers bear adverbial endings (p.6):

(62) | AQ                      | D-quantifier (pl.DAT) |
     | tama-tigut  | ‘always’         | tama-nut | ‘to all’  |
     | ilaani-kkut | ‘often’          | ilaan-nut| ‘to some’ |

However, her reference to these adverbial endings as “etymologically […] case markers” (p.6 fn.) suggests that these A-quantifiers are no different from their D counterparts.

4.2 Wharram (2003)

Wharram (2003) examines indefinites in Inuktitut and West Greenlandic in an attempt to account for their behaviour with respect to scope. Particularly, he addresses the “obligatory narrow-scope interpretation of the internal argument” as well as “the obligatory wide-scope interpretation of absolutive and ergative indefinites” (p.36).

Wharram presents the following data from Inuktitut to illustrate the availability of wide and narrow scope readings for seemingly indefinite nouns in Inuktitut (p.39-40):

(63) a. Taqqialu-up tuktu              taku-lau-nngit-t-a-(ng)a15
    T.-ERG caribou(ABS) see-past-neg-part-[-tr]-3sERG.3sABS
     i. # ‘Taqqialuk didn’t see a (single) caribou.’
     ii. ‘There is a (certain) caribou that Taqqialuk didn’t see.’

b. angunasuki atautsiq    ani-lau-nngit-t-u-q
    hunter(ABS) one(ABS) leave-past-neg-part-[-tr]-3sABS
     i. # ‘It is not the case that any hunter left.’
     ii. ‘There is one (particular) hunter that didn’t leave.’

15 Wharram uses the standard orthography for Inuktitut. Notably, /ŋ/ is written as “ng” and /ŋŋ/ is “nng”. Furthermore, he uses the standard term part(icipial) to refer to what I have called dec(larative).
Thus, in (a-b), the absolutive indefinite objects can only receive wide-scope readings. In (c-d) the incorporated object and the oblique argument of an antipassive verb, respectively, can only receive narrow-scope readings (see also Johns 2001). Lastly, in (e-f) the ergative arguments must receive wide-scope interpretations. Wharram argues that the necessity of these readings in Inuktitut is due to two things.

First, “a phonetically-null indefinite article denoting a choice function that is contextually determined” (p.76) is responsible for the wide-scope of ergative and absolutive arguments. While a complete explanation of choice functions is well beyond the scope of this work, the following quote from Kratzer (1998:p.6) offers some insight:

A choice function is a (often very) partial function from sets of individuals that picks a unique individual from any non-empty set in its domain. For the specific interpretation of some book, for example, the context of use has to determine a choice function f as the denotation of some. Some book, then, denotes the book that f picks from the set of all books.

Second, the narrow-scope readings of incorporated and oblique arguments are due to semantic incorporation, as laid out in van Geenhoven (1998), whereby “incorporating verbs introduce the existential quantification of their internal argument’s variable” (Wharram, p.59). However, it is unclear what prevents incorporated nouns from taking wide scope.

Once again, a detailed analysis of the semantics involved in semantic incorporation is beyond the scope of this paper. The important point for our purposes is the complexity of Wharram’s account of the possible scope readings in (63) and the assumption that the arguments in question are indefinite nouns (of type <e, t>) (p.69). I
will argue for a simpler analysis of the scope phenomena in section 4.8, assuming instead that the inherent specificity of nouns in Inuktitut prevents the alternative readings.

4.3 Problems with treating nouns as predicates

The discussions of quantifiers in Bittner (1995) and indefinites in Wharram (2003) are based on the assumption that nouns in Inuktitut are type \(<e,t>\) predicates which combine with a phonologically-null determiner, resulting in a type \(<e>\) argument. Yet, several facts about the language would seem to call this assumption into question.

First, Inuktitut consistently lacks overt determiners. There is no evidence of articles (phonologically-null or otherwise) except perhaps for the desire for cross-linguistic uniformity. Also, as pointed out in Section Three, the types of quantifiers present in Inuktitut behave as A-quantifiers, as does English \textit{all}. Furthermore, while there is a wide array of demonstratives, they can appear pronominally without an accompanying noun and are inflected for case and number like nouns:

\begin{equation}
\text{una} \quad \text{kiisi-lauq-t-u-q} \quad \text{uumija} \quad \text{(South Baffin)}
\end{equation}

\text{this.one bite-PAST-DEC-INTR-3SG this.one.ACC}

‘This one bit that one.’ (e.g. animals)

Moreover, even if these prove to be true demonstratives, they could equally be analysed as manifestations of Dem(onstrative) head.

Another argument against the treatment of nouns as predicates is that ordinary nouns cannot be predicated of other nouns, as is possible in a language like Hebrew:

\begin{equation}
\text{ha-yeled student}
\end{equation}

DEF-boy student

‘The boy is a student.’

A comparable Inuktitut structure in (66) is illicit and does not improve when the normal verbal morphology is added, as in (67) (see also Johns (1987)).

\begin{equation}
\text{palisi-nit} \quad \text{arna-it}
\end{equation}

police-ACC.PL woman-PL

\begin{equation}
\text{palisi-nit} \quad \text{arna-j-u-t}
\end{equation}

police-ACC.PL woman-DEC-INTR-3PL

Only with the copular morpheme \(-u\) can an otherwise unmodified noun\textsuperscript{16} act as a predicate:

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{16} In addition to the copular construction, certain possessive, adjectival, and even some quantifier suffixes on nouns allow them to act as predicates, as pointed out in Johns (1987).
(68) palisi-nit arna-u-j-u-t.
police-ACC.PL woman-COP-DEC-INTR-3PL
‘The police-officers are women.’

Note that unlike the English auxiliary _be_ and its various forms, the copula in Inuktitut does not encode tense or agreement and has no other purpose than creating a predicate.

An additional problem with assuming nouns are predicates is that singular nouns in Inuktitut cannot act as generics, as they can in languages like English. Compare the two possible readings for (69) with the sole possible reading for (70):

(69) A knife is a useful tool.
a. A certain knife is a useful tool.
b. Knives are useful tools.

(70) savik atu-tsiaq-tuq
knife useful-very-DEC-INTR-3.SG
a. ‘A certain knife is useful.’
b. # ‘Knives are useful.’

Rather, in order to achieve the generic interpretation in (70b), Inuktitut requires a pluralized noun:

(71) savi-it atu-tsiaq-t-u-it
knife-PL useful-very-DEC-INTR-3.PL
‘Knives are useful.’

This does not follow from nouns being predicates, as either singular or plural nouns may have generic interpretations in English. Rather, it points to an <e>-type interpretation of nouns that prevents such readings in the singular. The same results hold of a transitive verb in (72) and (73):

(72) qimmiq niqi-mit niri-suu-q.
dog meat-ACC eat-one.who-3SG
a. ‘A (certain) dog eats meat.’
b. # ‘Dogs eat meat.’

(73) qimmi-it niqi-mit niri-suu-t
dog-PL meat-ACC eat-one.who-3SG
‘Dogs eat meat.’

If nouns are predicates, why can a singular noun not be used generically?

The subsequent sections will examine several alternatives to the standard analysis of nouns and D-quantifiers in order to explain these problems and attempt to provide a different solution.
Matthewson (2001)’s discussion of quantification in St’át’imcets (also called Lillooet Salish) and parallel structures in English re-examines the standard analysis that quantifiers take <e,t> predicates as their sisters, as in (74) below (p.146):

(74)  
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\langle\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle \\
D \quad \text{NP} \\
\langle\langle e,t\rangle,\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle \quad \langle e,t\rangle \\
\end{array}
\]

*most*  *chiefs*

Matthewson observes that unlike English, quantified arguments in St’át’imcets always require a determiner in addition to the quantifier. Sentences in which quantifiers modify a noun without a determiner are ungrammatical. Compare (75) and (76) below:

(75)  
\[
\begin{array}{c}
léxlex \ [\text{tákem i smelhmúlhat-s-}] \\
\text{intelligent [all DET.PL woman(PL)-DET]} \\
\text{‘All (of the) women are intelligent.’}
\end{array}
\]

(76)  
\[
\begin{array}{c}
léxlex \ [\text{tákem smelhmúlhat}]_{17} \\
\text{intelligent [all woman(PL)]} \\
\text{‘All women are intelligent.’}
\end{array}
\]

Matthewson (correctly in my opinion) concludes that the structure of these quantified arguments includes separate Q and D heads (p.151):

(77)  
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{QP} \\
Q \quad \text{DP} \\
D \quad \text{NP} \\
\end{array}
\]

However, this structure forces us to change the semantic type of quantifiers in St’át’imcets. A quantifier combining with an argument will need to have the type \(\langle e,\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle\).

Thus, the question arises for Matthewson as to whether or not this is a case of cross-linguistic variation. Are the quantifiers in St’át’imcets unique in having the semantic type \(\langle e,\langle e,t\rangle,t\rangle\) or should we pursue a uniform analysis of quantifiers for all languages? Preferring what she calls “the no-variation null hypothesis” (p.156), she

---

17 Matthewson provides additional evidence that the circumfix \(i-\ldots-a\) is a determiner, as well as showing that without such determiners, nouns in St’át’imcets act as predicates.
argues that the proposed structure in (77) can accommodate languages like English. For instance, (78) below:

\[(78)\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{QP} \\
\text{Q} \\
\text{All} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{(the)} \\
\text{NP men}^{18}
\end{array}
\]

In contrast, the standard account of D-quantifiers cannot explain the St’át’imcets data without additional mechanisms. As such, her analysis in which Q and D are separate is shown to be superior.\(^{19}\)

While Matthewson’s analysis does not directly offer any clues in accounting for the lack of determiners in a language like Inuktitut nor the various problems in assuming null determiners, her novel account of D-quantification gives us an idea of the nature of Inuktitut quantifiers, which seem to correspond to the Q head that she advocates.

4.5 Chierchia (1998)

Chierchia (1998) examines variation in the denotation of nouns across languages and attempts to account for such differences using the notion of kind.

To account for the existence of languages which employ bare nouns as arguments, as well as those that require determiners, Chierchia assumes that nouns in some languages can denote kinds instead of predicates. According to him, for “any natural property, like the property of being a dog, there corresponds a kind, viz. the dog-kind” (p.348).\(^{20}\)

Chierchia proposes that the denotation of nouns is subject to cross-linguistic variation. He captures these differences with the binary features ±argument and ±predicate. With these two features, he outlines three types of languages. The first, [+arg,-pred], for languages which use bare nouns as type <e> arguments, such as

\begin{enumerate}
\item Each of the/these men.
\item Each man
\item * Every of the/these men.
\item Every man.
\end{enumerate}

If every corresponds to both Q and D this wouldexplain its quantificational content as well as its inability to occur with determiners. Matthewson alludes to every being a combination of Q and D yet prefers to keep the two nodes completely separate.

\(^{18}\) The presence of the preposition of in similar constructions is suggested to be due to case reasons.

\(^{19}\) While she discusses the challenges in accounting for English every using her analysis, I believe a Distributive Morphology analysis in which the vocabulary item every corresponds to both the set of features on Q and those on D can explain its distribution as compared to each:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Each of the/these men.
\item Each man
\item Every of the/these men.
\item Every man.
\end{enumerate}

\(^{20}\) Furthermore, Chierchia offers the mapping functions (and corresponding notations) between kinds and predicates.
Chinese. In such a language, nouns are taken to refer to kinds. As kinds are in some sense inherently plural, such languages are not expected to have a singular/plural distinction. A second type of language is [-arg,+pred], such as French or Italian. In this type of language, every NP is a predicate. Finally, in languages that are [+arg,+pred], such as English, NPs can denote either predicates or kinds.21

While seemingly applicable to a wide array of languages, Chierchia’s three-way typology of nominal denotations does not appear to explain the situation in Inuktitut, where singular nouns (by default) refer to specific individuals. Also, Chierchia’s predication that a [+arg,-pred] language will lack plural forms is not compatible with Inuktitut, which contains both plural and dual numbers. Rather, singular nouns refer to individuals and plural nouns seem to refer to groups of individuals.

4.6 Baker (2003)

Baker’s 2003 study of lexical categories attempts to differentiate the distinct properties of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. In doing so, Baker argues that nouns are the unique bearers or referential indices in the syntax, as well as the sole bearers of a “criterion of identity” in their semantics. Verbs, on the other hand, are uniquely predicative and the only lexical category to project a specifier. Adjectives, finally, are those lexical items which have neither the properties of nouns nor those of verbs.

In order to tease apart adjectives and verbs, especially in languages where adjectives bear verbal morphology, in addition to accounting for the dual nature of nominals as having both predicative and argumental roles, Baker argues for the functional head Pred, which was originally proposed in Bowers (1993). Pred, corresponding roughly to a light v, allows nouns and adjectives to act as predicates, as in (79) below (p.49, modified):

(79)

21 A fourth logical possibility is a language that is [-arg,-pred]. However, in such a language NPs would not be able to denote.
In (79), the presence of Pred allows an adjective, such as *sick*, or a DP, such as *a teacher*, to act as a predicate. Also, the subject of the sentence originates in the specifier position of Pred. Baker provides evidence that the English auxiliary verb *be* does not correspond to Pred. Rather, *be* is necessary for the realisation of tense and agreement in English, explaining its use in the progressive construction and passives.

In some other languages, however, certain copulas may in fact be manifestations of Pred. For instance, in Edo (a Nigerian language) both nouns and adjectives require copulas while verbs do not, as shown in (80) (p.40):

(80)  

a. Èmèrí mòsé.  
Mary  be.beautiful\_V  
‘Mary is beautiful.’

b. Èmèrí *(yé)* mòsèmòsè.  
Mary  PRED beautiful\_A  
‘Mary is beautiful.’

c. Úyì *(rè)* òkhaèmwèn.  
Uyi  PRED chief\_N  
‘Uyi is a chief.’

The copulas *yé* and *rè* allow adjectives and nouns, respectively, to work as predicates in this language.

Baker goes further than Chierchia in explaining the ability of bare nouns to act as arguments in many languages, proposing that all “nouns are always inherently argumental as a matter of Universal Grammar” (p.116). In order to act as predicates, nouns must combine with Pred. Determiners, then, are present only to convey such features as specific/non-specific and referential/non-referential. In his analysis, Baker rejects the idea that determiners convert nouns into arguments.

Most important for my analysis of Inuktitut, Baker examines the possibility of nouns being arguments instead of predicates. In addition, the Pred head described by Baker parallels the distribution of the Inuktitut copula -\_u\_- , which unlike English *be*, is unnecessary for the expression of tense and agreement in Inuktitut.

4.7 An alternative treatment of nouns in Inuktitut

Combining Matthewson’s bifurcation of quantifiers and determiners and Chierchia and Baker’s competing proposals for treating nouns as arguments instead of predicates in some (or even all) languages, we arrive at a suitable analysis of nouns and quantifiers in Inuktitut. I contend that nouns in Inuktitut are arguments by default and moreover that determiners (in fact D heads themselves) are completely absent from the language.

I propose that the quantifiers discussed in Section Three correspond to the Q head employed by Matthewson. Moreover, there are no determiners (covert, null,
otherwise) and nouns are all of type \(<e>\) by default in Inuktitut. In principle, I believe that these proposals are compatible with either Chierchia’s or Baker’s accounts of nouns, yet I make no assertions as to the semantic type of nouns cross-linguistically as Baker does. My account can accommodate either a theory of variation in the semantic type of nouns as being \(<e>\) in some languages and \(<e,t>\) in others, or Baker’s proposal that all nouns are argumental as a matter of UG. However, I reject Chierchia’s analysis of argument-type noun languages, as it precludes the existence of a language like Inuktitut (or Japanese, as pointed out in Baker) in which bare nouns act as arguments yet there is a singular/plural distinction. Alternatively, if cross-linguistic variation with respect to the semantic type of nouns does exist, I propose that it is better explained as being due to features on the lexical items themselves.

Several features relevant to explaining the disposition of determiners are discussed in Cowper & Hall 2003, which examines the feature geometry of the DP within the paradigm of Distributed Morphology (DM). In particular, Cowper & Hall make reference to the features \([D]\) and \([\text{Specific}]\) of determiners, which are parts of the larger geometry in (81) below (p.2, square brackets added):

(81)  
\[
[D] \\
| \\
[\text{Specific}] \\
| \\
[\text{Definite}] \\
| \\
\text{[Deictic]} [\text{Distal}]
\]

The feature \([D]\) is described as meaning “(potentially) referential” (p.3) and corresponding to a determiner head. Similarly, \([\text{Specific}]\) is defined as “denoting a particular individual (or group of individuals)”. While these features are part of determiners in languages like English, it may be that one or both of them are dependents of the category N in languages like Inuktitut. Cowper (2003) observes that languages use a subset of the “features or linguistic properties provided by UG” (p.12) and that these features can be packaged into different vocabulary items and lexical items. Thus, it is conceivable that lexical roots corresponding to nouns in Inuktitut contain, for instance, the feature \([\text{Specific}]\), while in other languages such features are dependents of D:

(82)  
\[
\text{Inuktitut: } \sqrt{\text{ROOT}}_{<e>} \\
| \\
[D] \\
| \\
[\text{Specific}] \\
\]

\[
\text{English: } \text{DP}_{<e>} \\
D \\
| \\
[\text{D}] \\
| \\
[\text{Specific}]
\]

The presence of such features could also determine the semantic type of a given category as either \(<e>\) or \(<e,t>\).
Yet another possible location for these features is examined in Baker (2003) in reference to Marantz (2000). Marantz proposes “n” and “a” nodes, parallel to light v, which merge with otherwise undifferentiated roots causing them to be interpreted as nouns and adjectives, respectively. Features such as [D] or [Specific], then could conceivably be dependents of this little n in Inuktitut, while dependent on D in other languages:

\[(83)\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Inuktitut:} \\
\begin{array}{c}
nP_{<e>} \\
\Downarrow \\
\text{n} \\
\Downarrow \\
([D])^{22} \\
\Downarrow \\
[\text{Specific}] \\
\end{array} \\
\sqrt{\text{ROOT}} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{English:} \\
\begin{array}{c}
DP_{<e>} \\
\Downarrow \\
D \\
\Downarrow \\
\text{n} \\
\Downarrow \\
\sqrt{\text{ROOT}} \\
\end{array} \\
\end{array}
\]

This analysis has the advantage of explaining the lack of specific reading\(^{23}\) in noun-incorporation constructions, since the root alone would conceivably undergo incorporation without merging with little n and therefore lack the [specific] feature. Under either analysis, some languages would require determiners while others would not (see van Geenhoven (1998)).

On the other hand, if we prefer Baker’s proposal of cross-linguistic uniformity for nouns, it may simply be that nominal roots are always of type \(<e>\) and that determiners play no role in creating arguments.

Regardless of our stance on cross-linguistic variation with respect to types, the absence of certain quantifiers in Inuktitut is due to the absence of a D head. D-quantifiers such as English every and no have no equivalent in Inuktitut due to this absence. Furthermore, since nouns are not predicates, but individuals, singular nouns modified by quantifiers can only quantify over that same individual, never the contextually salient set of things corresponding to that noun:

\[(84)\]

\[
\text{tamar-mi iglu-dʒuaq miŋua-lauq-t-a-ra} \\
\text{all-ACC house-big paint-PAST-DEC-TR-1SG.3SG} \\
\text{a. ‘I painted all of the house.’ (the entire house)} \\
\text{b. ‘I painted every house.’} \\
\]

Also, negative D-quantifiers such as no and the related forms such as nothing and no one are not present in the language. Instead, phrase-level negation is used:

\[(85)\]

\[
\text{qamuti usiqŋittuq} \\
\text{sled load-have-NEG-DEC-INTR-3.SG} \\
\text{‘There is nothing on the sled.’ (Lit. The sled does not have a load.)} \\
\]

\(^{22}\) For geometries in which a determiner is not present, the feature [D] might better be termed [Referential].

\(^{23}\) However, incorporated nouns may well be referential, as is widely argued.
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(86)  iqalu-juaq-ta-ngit-t-u-q  \(\text{\textit{Mittimatalik}}\)
    fish-big-NOM-have-NEG-DEC-INTR-3.SG
    ‘No fish are big.’ (\textit{Lit. There is not a big fish})
(87)  tuktu-∅-tu-qa-lau-ngit-t-u-q  \(\text{\textit{Mittimatalik}}\)
    caribou-get-NOM-have-PAST-NEG-DEC-INTR-3.SG
    ‘No one got a caribou.’ (\textit{Lit. There is not one who got a caribou.})

While the target sentences for (85-87) all include forms of the negative quantifier \textit{no}, the consultant consistently produced sentences with sentential negation instead. It appears that a determiner-free analysis correctly predicts the lack of D-quantifiers.

4.8 Benefits of treating nouns as arguments instead of predicates

Aside from explaining the lack of determiners and D-quantifiers, the proposed analysis in section 4.7 also explains why singular nouns cannot express generic readings. Assuming Inuktitut nouns to be individuals bearing a [Specific] feature, singular generics are ruled out since they are not predicates. In order to refer to, for example, \textit{dogs} in general, Inuktitut will require a plural noun extending to the entire group of individual dogs.

Another benefit of my analysis is that it offers a simple alternative to Wharram’s account of the scope of indefinites in Inuktitut. The absolutive object in sentence (63a), repeated here as (88), can only have a wide-scope reading because it is not an indefinite, as assumed by Wharram.

(88)  Taqqialu-up tuktu  taku-lau-ngit-t-a-(ng)a\(^{24}\)
  T.-ERG caribou(ABS) see-past-neg-part-[+tr]-3sERG.3sABS
  a. # ‘Taqqialuk didn’t see a (single) caribou.’
  b. ‘There is a (certain) caribou that Taqqialuk didn’t see.’

Rather, \textit{tuktu} itself means \textit{a certain caribou}. Since \textit{tuktu} is not an indefinite, scope is not a factor. A similar sentence in English illustrates the impossibility of a narrow-scope reading:

(89)  John didn’t see a certain caribou.
  a. # ‘John didn’t see a (single) caribou.’
  b. ‘There is a certain caribou that John didn’t see.’

The explicit specificity induced by adding “\textit{a certain…” in (89) rules out a narrow-scope reading for \textit{caribou}. While somewhat less obvious in (88), I contend that \textit{tuktu} is equally specific. The same appears to hold for ergative arguments as in (63e), repeated as (90):

\(^{24}\) Wharram uses the standard orthography for Inuktitut. Notably, /ŋ/ is written as “ng” and /ŋŋ/ is “nng”. Furthermore, he uses the standard term \textit{part(icipial)} to refer to what I have called \textit{ind(icative)}. 
(90) angunasukti-up atautsi-up Ulluriaq taku-lau-nngit-t-a-(ng)a
    hunter-ERG one-ERG U.(ABS) see-past-neg-part-[+tr]-3sERG.3sABS
    a. # ‘It is not the case that any hunter left.’
    b. ‘There is one hunter that didn’t leave.’

Again, assuming that angunasuki-up in fact roughly means a certain/specific hunter, only
the attested reading in (90b) will be possible (see also Manga, 1996).

More problematic for my account are those sentences from Wharram in which
incorporated and oblique nouns can take narrow scope, such as (63c-d) repeated (91-92):

(91) Ulluriaq iqaluk-tu-nngit-t-u-q
    U.(ABS) fish-TUQ-neg-part-[−tr]-3sABS
    a. ‘Ulluriaq didn’t eat a (single) fish.’
    b. # ‘There is a fish/are fish that Ulluriaq didn’t eat.’

(92) Akittiq iqalung-mik taku-∅-nngit-t-u-q
    A.(ABS) fish-MOD see-AP-neg-part-[−tr]-3sABS
    a. ‘Akittiq didn’t/doesn’t see (even) a single fish.’
    b. # ‘There is a (particular) fish that Akittiq doesn’t /didn’t see.

This is not predicted if nouns in this language are inherently specific. However,
assuming the little n of Marantz (2000) and the corresponding structure in (83) above, it
may be that incorporated nouns are only bare undifferentiated roots, which arguably
could be of type <e,t>. Not having been licensed as true nouns by little n, such roots
would not have been specified as [Specific] and thus would be able act as narrow-scope
indefinites. Observe also that comparable English structures show similar scope effects:

(93) I did not baby-sit.
    a. ‘I did not mind any babies.’
    b. # ‘There is/are a baby/babies that I did not mind.’

The compounding in (93) has produced the same scope effect as the Inuktitut noun-
incorporation structure in (91).

Yet, we are left to account for the obligatory narrow-scope of the oblique
argument in (92). Johns (p.c., 2001) suggests that -mik arguments may in fact receive
partitive interpretations. Consider the sentence in (94):

(94) John didn’t drink some of the coffee.25
    a. # ‘There is some coffee that John didn’t drink.’
    b. ‘John didn’t drink any of the coffee.’

25 While it is possible to get the interpretation in (37a) when stress is placed on some, a more out-of-the-
blue intonation strongly disfavours this reading.
It would appear, even in English, that partitives can prevent wide-scope readings. Furthermore, Wharram admits that there appears to be a correlation between case and scope.

The argument that nouns in Inuktitut are by default specific arguments provides a simple alternative to Wharram’s analysis of scope using choice functions.

Finally, treating nouns as arguments explains the distribution of the copula in Inuktitut. Nouns, even with the usual agreement, mood, and transitivity markers, cannot act alone as predicates. In order to predicate other nouns, the copula is required:

(95) paliisi arna-u-j-u-(q)  \hspace{1cm} (South Baffin)
    police woman-COP-DEC-INTR-3SG
    ‘The police-officer is a woman.’

(96) *paliisi arna-j-u(q)  \hspace{1cm} (South Baffin)

Assuming nouns are arguments explains the need for the copula, which essentially creates predicates out of inherently argument-type nouns.

4.9 Loose ends

While the analysis of nouns as arguments explains various facts about the distribution of nouns and the types of quantifiers present in Inuktitut, it does not offer any insights into the apparent duality of -innaq and -tuinnaq as meaning all in some contexts and only in others. In fact, it seems to contradict Denny (1981)’s analysis of these morphemes, which assumes that nouns in the language are both arguments and predicates at the same time. Yet, his account of -innaq and -tuinnaq ignores their double-meaning.

Another unresolved issue associated with my analysis is that it does not account for the narrow-scope reading available to ergative arguments in only West Greenlandic according to Wharram (p.38):

(97) suli atuartu-p ataatstip Juuna uqaluqatigi-sima-nngi-l-a-a
    still student-ERG one-ERG J.(ABS) talk.with-perf-neg-ind-[-+tr]-3sERG.3sABS
    a. ‘No student has talked with Juuna yet.’
    b. ‘There is one student who hasn’t talked with Juuna yet.’

Assuming nouns are specific arguments, the ergative argument atuartup ataatstip should only be able to receive a wide scope reading, as in (97b), not the narrow-scope reading in (97a). I am unable to account for this fact about West Greenlandic, in part because I have no access to speakers of the language.

Finally, I cannot entirely discount the argument made by Bittner that both A-quantification and D-quantification exists in West Greenlandic, except to say that the evidence for such a distinction is, at the very least, inconclusive. I expect, however, that many of the observations made herein regarding quantifiers and nouns in Inuktitut may extend to West Greenlandic.
5 Scope and structure

This section discusses the scope available to negation and quantified arguments in different positions as well as the syntactic structure of Inuktitut as it relates to scope. The syntactic analysis of scope is yet another alternative for explaining scope in Inuktitut. However, as I intend to show, a syntactic account alone cannot explain the distinct readings for singular and plural objects, nor the availability of both collective and dual interpretations of incorporated ones. Rather, specificity alone can explain the data.

Throughout, I assume syntactic scope to be a function of c-command between two scope-taking elements.

5.1 Scope of negation

As we have already seen in Section Four, incorporated arguments take narrow scope with respect to negation. However, it also appears to be the case that negation cannot take wide scope over unincorporated subjects:

(98) ilaŋit iqaluk-tu-suŋ-uŋit-tut
part-3PL.GEN fish-consume-one.who-COP-NEG-IND-INTR-3PL
∃~ ‘Some (people) don’t eat fish.’

This sentence cannot mean no one eats fish. One possibility for this is that ilaŋit occurs higher up in the structure than the negation morpheme. The next sentence, on the other hand, shows that negation does in fact seem to c-command incorporated arguments:

(99) atausi-uŋŋit-t-u-q
one-COP-NEG-IND-INTR-3SG
∄∃ ‘There isn’t one.’

Similarly, this sentence cannot have the meaning; one (of them) isn’t.

Yet another fact about negation is that it seems to take scope over quantifiers like -tuinna(q) within the verbal complex:

(100) qamuti-qaq-tuinna-uŋŋit-t-u-gut
sled-have-TUINNAQ-COP-NEG-IND-INTR-1PL
∀~ ‘We don’t all have sleds.’

Negation normally appears to the right of such quantifiers while at the same it appears to c-command them. Furthermore, structures whose meanings would require negation to appear to their left of quantifiers within the verbal complex are avoided.26

26 Curiously, such structures in which other quantifiers take scope over negation are avoided in English as well. #I only don’t eat cabbage is awkward compared to The only thing that I don’t eat is cabbage or I eat everything but cabbage.
I take this as evidence that the negation morpheme \textit{-ŋŋit-} must c-command predicate-internal quantifiers. As well, given the data from Wharram (2003:39-40), such as (101-103) below (repeated from Section Four), ergative and absolutive arguments (see also Johns 1996 and Bittner 1994) must also, in turn, c-command negation, while accusative arguments and incorporated ones cannot:

\begin{flushleft}
(101) \text{Angunasukti-up atautsi-up Ulluriaq tuku-lau-ngit-t-a-(ng)a} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{hunter-ERG one-ERG U.(ABS) see-past-neg-part-[+tr]-3sERG.3sABS} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{a. # ‘No hunter saw Ulluriaq.’} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{b. ‘There is one hunter who didn’t see Ulluriaq.’} \\
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
(102) \text{Angunasuki atautsiq ani-lau-ngit-t-u-q} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{hunter(ABS) one(ABS) leave-past-neg-part-[tr]-3sABS} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{a. # ‘It is not the case that any hunter left.’} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{b. ‘There is one (particular) hunter that didn’t leave.’} \\
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
(103) \text{Akittiq iqalung-mik tuku-∅-ngit-t-u-q} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{A.(ABS) fish-MOD see-AP-neg-part-[tr]-3sABS} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{a. ‘Akittiq didn’t/doesn’t see (even) a single fish.’} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{b. # ‘There is a (particular) fish that Akittiq doesn’t /didn’t see.’} \\
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
(104) \text{Ulluriaq iqaluk-tu-ngit-t-u-q} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{U.(ABS) fish-TUQ-neg-part-[tr]-3sABS} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{a. ‘Ulluriaq didn’t eat a (single) fish.’} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{b. # ‘There is a fish/are fish that Ulluriaq didn’t eat.’} \\
\end{flushleft}

The structures responsible for these c-command relationships are examined in section 5.4.

5.2 Scope of independent (non-incorporated) arguments

While singular indefinite noun phrases in languages like English appear to act as quantifiers\textsuperscript{27}, the same is not true in Inuktitut. Rather, as discussed in Section Four, singular unmodified arguments\textsuperscript{28} are specific with respect to other quantified arguments and thus require a collective reading, as in (105). Plural arguments, in contrast, are free to take distributive readings, as in (106).

\begin{flushleft}
(105) \text{ŋuti-limaa-t iglu-mi sana-qau-j-u-t} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{man-LIMAA-PL house-ACC.SG craft-PAST-IND-INTR-3PL} \\
\hspace{1cm} \text{‘All the men made a house.’} \\
\end{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{27} In that they are able to take either distributive or collective readings.

\textsuperscript{28} Wharram assumes bare noun phrases to be indefinites, however I argue that they are specific and lack the properties of indefinites such as being able to take scope and act as a generic.
Nothing in this analysis prevents (106) from also taking a collective reading in which the men worked collectively on a group of houses, however, possibly due to pragmatic considerations, it receives only a distributive reading. This also appears to be the case of the English translation of (106), *all the men made houses*, for which a collective reading, albeit possible, is somewhat unlikely.

5.3 Scope of incorporated arguments

Unlike unincorporated arguments, incorporated objects can take either wide or narrow scope with respect to a quantifier outside the verbal complex, as in (107), or within, as in (108):

(107) tamar-mi aŋuti-t nanuq-ŋua-liuq-qau-j-u-t
    all-ACC man-PL polar.bear-pretend-make-PAST-IND-INTR-3PL
    ‘All the men made a/some polar bear carving(s).’

(108) aŋuti-t qamuti-liu-tuinnaq-qau-j-u-t
    man-PL sled-make-TUINNAQ-PAST-IND-INTR-3PL
    ‘All the men made a sled/sleds.’

The most notable difference between the previous non-incorporated arguments in (105) and (106) and these examples in (107) and (108) is that the latter are without number or case. As argued in Johns (2003), incorporated arguments are (normally) simply roots “devoid of nominal inflection” (p.2). As such, they lack a singular/plural distinction that is made explicit elsewhere in the language. Thus, they are able to be interpreted as singular or plural and consequently as either collective or distributive, respectively.

5.4 Possible structures

Various syntactic structures have been proposed to account for noun-incorporation, ergativity, the antipassive construction, and scope phenomena in Inuktitut. Wharram (2003:24-25) assumes the right-headed structure in (109) below for ergative/absolutive sentences:
In (109), the absolutive argument is merged with the verb yet moves to spec of IP, while the ergative argument remains in situ in spec of light v.

Bittner (1994) proposes a similar structure for such sentences in the Government and Binding framework. She too assumed the absolutive/nominative argument merges lower than the ergative argument and then moves to spec of IP. She gives the following general structure for an ergative sentence containing negation (p.2):

Yet another structure for ergative sentences is proposed in Spreng (2001). Spreng assumes left-headedness; however the relative surface position of the ergative and absolutive arguments remains the same (p.170,180):
Under this analysis, functional morphemes are attached to the verb through head adjunction as the verb moves to light $v$ and then $T$.

For my purposes, a structure similar to Wharram’s will be assumed to avoid having to deal with motivations for movement, as that is not the central theme of this paper. However, several additional heads corresponding to the verbal morphology will be added, namely Tr(ansitivity), Mood, and Asp(ect), as well as Neg(ation).

The need for a Tr(ansitivity) projection (first proposed for Inuktitut in Murasugi 1992) in addition to light $v$ is motivated by the presence of two contrasting morphemes, -u- and -a-, which mark intransitivity and transitivity, respectively:

\[(112) \quad \text{taku-j-a-ra} \]
\[\text{see-DEC-TR-3SG.3SG} \]
\[\text{‘He saw it.’} \]

\[(113) \quad \text{taku-j-u-q} \]
\[\text{see-DEC-INTR-3SG} \]
\[\text{‘He saw.’} \]

These morphemes occur between the mood marker and the agreement morphology on verbs or other predicative elements, and since it would seem odd to collapse a transitivity marker into either mood or agreement, I will use Tr to house them. This head was proposed in Collins (1997) in which he uses it as a light $v$. Note that nothing hinges on my use of Tr instead of a second light $v$.

The basic structure I assume for transitive (ergative/absolutive) sentences is that of (114), in which I have included a NegP for reasons we will see later:
Unlike Wharram, Bittner, and Spreng, I assume that both ergative and absolutive arguments are attracted to higher positions in the structure. The reason for this assumption is the scope behaviour of these arguments. As pointed out by Wharram in (101-102) above, ergative and absolutive arguments uniformly take scope over negation in Inuktitut. Since the linear position of negation between aspect and mood gives it scope over lower A-positions, I take this as evidence for the movement of the ergative argument to a higher position. In (114), both arguments c-command (and thus take scope over) negation.

In contrast, accusative and incorporated arguments always appear to be in the scope of negation. Accordingly, I assume the following structures for antipassive (nominative/accusative) and intransitive constructions, as in (115), and sentences involving incorporation, such as (116):
Thus, in (115) only the nominative argument is attracted upwards while the accusative argument remains as the sister of the verb. In (116), following Johns (2003), there is no lexical verb, merely a nominal root which incorporates into the light v.

The fact that Neg c-commands both the accusative argument in (115) and the incorporated root in (116) accounts for the fact that neither of these arguments can have wide scope over negation.

In (115) and (116) I analyse both nominal and absolutive arguments as merging into the spec of light v since they have identical forms. Both occur as bare nouns, while ergative and accusative require additional morphology.

Note that in the ergative construction in (114), the Tr morpheme -a- attracts the ergative argument as a specifier, while the intransitive morpheme -u- in (115-116) does not. I assume that the transitive version of Tr has a strong case feature that must be checked by the ergative argument, which also bears a corresponding feature. For this reason, accusative arguments cannot occur with transitive -a-, nor can ergative arguments occur with intransitive -u-, since the relevant feature would go unchecked.

Using the structures above, along with the crucial assumption that nouns are inherently arguments, not indefinites, we can explain the scope phenomena of nouns presented by Wharram as well as the distributive and collective readings available for sentences with quantifiers.

First, the wide-scope of ergative and absolutive indefinites and the narrow-scope of accusative and incorporated indefinites with respect to negation, presented in Wharram, can simply be attributed to c-command. For instance, the ergative indefinite in (117) must take wide scope over negation, since it c-commands Neg (from (101)):

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29 While the order of arguments in the tree structure of (18) does not match the order in the sentence, I assume that the final order is due to scrambling or focus.
Angunasuki-up atautsi-up Ulluriaq taku-lau-nngit-t-a-(ng)a
hunter-ERG one-ERG U.(ABS) see-past-neg-part-[+tr]-3sERG.3sABS
∃~
‘No hunter saw Ulluriaq.’
‘There is one hunter who didn’t see Ulluriaq.’

Similarly, the absolutive indefinite argument in (117) below must take scope over negation because it c-commands Neg (sentence repeated from (102)): 
On the other hand, both accusative and incorporated nouns can only be interpreted within the scope of negation, since Neg c-commands them. I argue that scope of these narrow-scope indefinites from Wharram can be explained using the structures in (118) (from (103) above) and (119) (from (104)) Note the specific interpretations of the translations in question:

(118)

Angunasukti atautsiq ani-lau-nngit-t-u-q  \[\exists\]

hunter(ABS) one(ABS) leave-past-neg-part-[tr]-3sABS

# ‘It is not the case that any hunter left.’

‘There is one (particular) hunter that didn’t leave.’
(119)

Akittiq iqalung-mik taku-∅-ngit-t-u-q
A.(ABS) fish-MOD see-AP-neg-part-[tr]-3sABS

‘Akittiq didn’t/doesn’t see (even) a single fish.’

# ‘There is a (particular) fish that Akittiq doesn’t /didn’t see.’

---

30 Again, I assume nominative and absolutive to be essentially the same case given that they are identical in form. What Wharram refers to as MOD, I assume to be nominative/absolutive.
To reiterate, both accusative nouns and incorporated nouns, being within the scope of negation, can only receive narrow scope.

Turning now to scope phenomena between quantified arguments and other elements, the same generalisation would seem to hold that c-command can explain the available readings.

To begin, negation not only appears to c-command accusative and incorporated arguments, but also adverbial infixes such as -tuinna(q) (sentence repeated from (100)): 
Thus, in (121), the morpheme of negation appears higher than the universal –tuinnaq), taking scope over it. This sentence cannot have the reading we all don’t have sleds.\(^{31}\)

While the syntactic account presented so far can account for wide-scope ergative and absolutive arguments, as well as narrow-scope accusative and incorporated arguments, as well as quantifiers, with respect to negation, the next section examines data that is problematic for an analysis based on c-command.

5.5 Problems for a syntactic account of scope

As presented earlier, incorporated arguments can take either wide or narrow scope with respect to an external quantified argument or a predicate-internal quantifier. For instance, (122) and (123) (from (107) and (108)) (see also van Geenhoven, 1998):

\(^{31}\) For achieve such a meaning, the universal quantifier is omitted, leaving: qamutiqaqumjittugut, ‘we don’t have sleds’.
Yet, given the assumed structure for such sentences, they should only be able to receive a single distributive reading, since the quantified argument *tamar-mi anjuti*, ‘all men’, c-commands the incorporated argument *nanu(q)*, ‘bear’, in (122) and the infixed quantifier *-tuinna(q)*, ‘all’, c-commands the incorporated argument *qamuti*, ‘sled’, in (123).

Even more problematic for a syntactic account is the fact that non-incorporated arguments receive different readings depending on their number. Thus, (124) and (125) (101-102 above) have opposite readings despite having identical structure, except number:

(124) aŋuti-limaa-t iglu-mi sana-qau-j-u-t
man-LIMAA-PL house-ACC.SG craft-PAST-IND-INTR-3PL
‘All the men made a (single) house.’

(125) aŋuti-limaa-t iglu-ni sana-qau-j-u-t
man-LIMAA-PL house-ACC-PL craft-PAST-IND-INTR-3PL
‘All the men made houses.’

If scope readings in Inuktitut are due to syntactic positions, why does the accusative argument in (124) and (125) receive different interpretations depending on number? While the plural version might (for pragmatic reasons) necessitate distributive readings, we would expect the singular, if it is an indefinite, to behave as in English:

(126) All the men made a house.
   a. A single house was made by the men.
   b. The men each made their own house.

That this is not the case, I take as evidence against treating such nouns as indefinites in Inuktitut. Instead *iglumi*, ‘house’, itself should be taken to mean *a certain house*.

To attempt to explain the availability of readings, one might resort to quantifier raising (QR), whereby arguments at LF can be interpreted in higher positions. For instance, assuming incorporated arguments to be low with respect to quantifiers (as in 122-123), they might raise at LF in order to take scope over the quantifiers. This optional operation could account for the availability of both collective and distributive readings. However, we are left to explain why QR is not available to unincorporated arguments, as in (124-125), in which only one reading is possible.

32 While the quantifier *tamar-mi* here is in accusative, the argument it modifies is nominative/absolutive. The accusative case appears to behave as a modifying case on certain quantifiers.
I contend that the most relevant fact pertaining to scope in Inuktitut is that incorporated arguments, which appear to be the only arguments that can receive more than one scope reading, are also the only arguments to appear without inflection for number. As they are neither singular nor plural, but merely nominal roots, they can be interpreted (perhaps pragmatically) as either singular or plural and (perhaps due to the lack of a little n as discussed in the previous section) are not interpreted as [specific]. On the other hand, non-incorporated arguments do receive a specific interpretation and it is their number that permits collective or distributive interpretations. Consider the English sentences in (127) and (128):

(127) All the men built a specific house.

(128) All the men built specific houses.

These sentences seem to mirror what is happening in Inuktitut. The singular (and intentionally specific) object in (127) can only receive a collective reading, while the plural of that same object in (128) strongly implies a distributive reading. The incorporated sentences then, lacking number on their object, might be able to receive both collective and distributive readings for the same reason as the following sentence:

(129) All the men built an unknown number of houses.

I interpret (129) to be ambiguous (or perhaps vague) as to whether it is collective or distributive. This is due to the uncertainty with respect to number, as is also the case with incorporated nouns in Inuktitut.

An additional hurdle for a specificity-based account of scope in Inuktitut is that accusative arguments, which we have seen appear to be specific, take only narrow scope with respect to negation in Wharram’s data. Johns (p.c.) suggests that the accusative -mik case in Inuktitut seems to dampen the inherent specificity of nouns. Furthermore, the so-called accusative case appears to vary in its usage across dialects of Inuktitut. Johns (2001) points out that this case is used as “a full oblique case in western dialects, […] similar to a partitive case in Central dialects; and it has become essentially an accusative case marker in Labrador Inuttut” (p. 132). As such, varying degrees of specificity of accusative arguments (resulting in different scopes) may be due to variation between dialects in the level of specificity and partitivity of -mik.

Thus, while an analysis based on syntactic scope can be extended (assuming certain landing sites, etc.) to account for the wide-scope of ergative and absolutive arguments, the role of number in interpreting incorporated arguments, as compared to accusative ones, requires an approach that deals directly with specificity and number. Moreover, QR cannot account for the availability of both collective and distributive readings for incorporated nouns, since in other constructions in which we would equally expect the possibility of QR there is only one possible reading.
Conclusion

The previous sections have examined several aspects of the behaviour of nouns and quantifiers in Inuktitut which together point towards a determiner-free analysis of the language. While these properties of Inuktitut might at first seem unrelated, they fall out naturally from an account that posits the absence of D heads.

The first such argument, albeit the least potent, is the complete absence of determiners in the language. Neither definite nor indefinite determiners are present. While there are demonstratives, they behave more like nominals taking case and number inflection. Also, they can appear alone as arguments without nouns.

Another piece of evidence is the absence of D-quantifiers like *every* and *no*. Although *ila*- and *atu*- correspond roughly to ‘some’ and ‘each’, respectively, their properties are uncharacteristic of D-quantifiers. First, *ila*- is in fact a noun, meaning ‘part’, and requires genitive case to act as ‘some’. Second, *atu-*, unlike English *each*, combines with plural nouns, a behaviour characteristic of an A-quantifier. Overall, the quantifiers present in Inuktitut behave like A-quantifiers, except for *ila-* which takes nominal inflection.

A further sign that determiners are not part of the syntax of Inuktitut is the need for a copula. While verbs with the proper agreement and mood morphology can modify arguments, nouns require an additional copular infix -u- in order to act as predicates. Even when the normal verbal morphology is added, nouns cannot act as predicates without employing the copula. This does not follow from nouns being inherently <e,t> predicates. If nouns were indeed predicates, what would the semantic contribution of the predicate be?

Yet another reason to treat nouns as arguments, and moreover specific nouns, is their behaviour with respect to quantification. The fact that both ergative and absolutive arguments always take scope over negation, as well as the importance of singular and plural number in determining the collective and distributive readings available to accusative arguments suggest that it is not scope but rather specificity that determines the availability of interpretations.

One challenge for a specificity account however, is the highly variable nature of the accusative (or -mik) case across dialects. With respect to negation, this case appears to remove the meaning of specificity from a noun (as shown by Wharram), while with respect to a nominative quantified argument it receives an interpretation based on number. Johns (2001) describes the distinct interpretations this case receives in different geographical areas; having oblique, partitive, and accusative meanings in different dialects. While dialectal differences between Wharram’s consultants and my own are possibly responsible, this issue remains unresolved and I leave it to further research.

In sum, I contend that these phenomena conspire to indicate the lack of D heads in the syntax of Inuktitut. Instead, it would seem that nouns are inherently specific arguments and that, in fact, they require additional morphology (Johns, p.c.), such as the accusative case marker, in order to become non-specific. While this assumption contradicts the cross-linguistic hypothesis that nouns require determiners, it provides a unified account of the phenomena discussed herein.
Bibliography


